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CASE COMMENTS
PERSONALITY IN ILLINOIS PRENATAL
TORT LAW
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital
INTRODUCTION
"Are lawyers, courts, big government dulling America's moral
sense?" This question headlined a recent U.S. News and World
Report article' in which the writer noted a trend in America away
from traditional notions of personal responsibility for the common
good to a new attitude of evasion of duty with accountability for ac-
tions imposed from without. Cited in the article as evidence of drift
away from duty and responsibility was a case, Renslow v. Men-
nonite Hospital,2 handed down August 8, 1977, by the Illinois
Supreme Court, wherein a minor plaintiff brought an action in tort
for injuries suffered through the alleged negligence and misconduct
of the defendant hospital and doctor. The case's novelty lay in the
fact that the conduct, transfusions given the plaintiffs mother,
antedated the conception of the plaintiff by several years. Con-
sideration here of the court's treatment of the principles of duty and
personality is intended primarily to locate this precedent-making
decision within the context of prior Illinois Supreme Court cases,
and secondarily to show the application of traditional legal concepts
and principles to a new sphere of interests created and increasingly
enlarged by advances in medical science. More broadly, this com-
ment may be seen as a very brief description of the jurisprudence of
this area of tort law and of the process whereby the social ramifica-
tions of these advances have been mediated into conclusions of law.
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The right to bring suit for prenatal injuries in cases like
Renslow is controlled by judicial treatment of the anomalous rela-
tion of legal entities presented by mother and fetus during pregnan-
cy. The difficulty of determining when and for what purposes one
1. U.S. News and World Report (Sept. 26, 1977).
2. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Renslow].
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person may be said to have become two had led legal analysts to
frame their syllogism in this way: all right-holders are legal persons;
no unborn child is a legal person; hence, no unborn child is a right-
holder.3 As a non-right-holder, the unborn child was unable to com-
plain in court of injuries suffered in utero. Live birth, as a clear and
unimpeachable point of reference, was taken as the necessary per-
sonalizing moment for the purposes of bringing an action in tort.
Also, since tort law is the regulation of conduct between persons
who mutually hold and owe rights and duties as such,' the putative
defendant in tort could owe no legal duty or standard of conduct to
one without personal existence. No liability could attach either
before birth or at any point after conduct for injuries to the unborn.
Live birth signalled the first moment at which a duty might be im-
posed on other persons for the benefit of the child.
The development of tort doctrine, typified in Illinois cases prior
to Renslow, was accomplished by modification of the middle or ex-
istential term of the legal syllogism. In this way, the moment of
legal personality of the unborn (and hence of a possible duty to it)
was pushed back from live birth to other identifiable points during
pregnancy, especially that of viability, the moment at which the
fetus can sustain life apart from the mother. Renslow represents a
movement back beyond live birth, viability, previability or even con-
ception. In this it demonstrates the formal completion of the concept
of personality in this area of the law. Analysis here of the Renslow
decision will center briefly on its facts and holding, followed by
presentation of prior case law which will serve as a background for
final treatment of the issues of duty and personality raised in the
Justices' opinions.'
THE FACTUAL SITUATION
In 1965, when Emma Renslow, the plaintiffs mother, was 13
years of age, the defendant hospital and doctor gave her two large
transfusions of Rh-negative blood. These transfusions were incom-
3. Cf. Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942), discussed in
Cowen, An Agenda for Jurisprudence, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 609, 622 (1964).
4. This working definition of tort may be compared with others given in
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 1-2 (4th ed. 1971), in which the difficulty of giving a single,
comprehensive definition is discussed. The analysis of Renslow is intended to apply
only to such other tort suits as come within the parameters of the definition given.
5. The opinion of the majority in Renslow was delivered by Mr. Justice
Moran, with Justices Goldenhersh and Clark joining. The late Mr. Justice Dooley filed
a concurring opinion. Justices Underwood and Ryan and Chief Justice Ward dissented,
and each filed an opinion.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1978], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss3/5
PRENATAL PERSONALITY
patible with her own Rh-positive blood and left it in a sensitized
state. Neither the improper substitution of Rh factors nor its effects
on Emma were discovered until December, 1973, when she was
pregnant with Leah Ann Renslow, the plaintiff. Labor was induced
in March, 1974, to avoid possible damage or death to the plaintiff as
a result of injury due to her mother's sensitized blood. Prematurely
born, the plaintiff suffered from jaundice and hyperbilirubinemia, a
condition caused by obstruction of the flow of bile from the liver and
gall bladder to the intestine.7 A complete transfusion of blood was
given the plaintiff at birth and another shortly thereafter. Plaintiff
brought suit, alleging that the sensitization of her mother's blood
through defendants' negligence and misconduct led to oxygen
deprivation to the tissues of her body, resulting in permanent
damage to various organs, her brain and nervous system.'
The plaintiff's suit was dismissed at the trial level because she
was not in existence at the time of the defendants' tortious conduct
and hence had no cause of action. The trial court did not reach the
issue of duty. On appeal, the dismissal was reversed; the court there
held that non-existence would not bar an action where duty and
causality could be found.' The case was accordingly remanded for
consideration of those issues.
A certificate of importance brought the case before the Illinois
Supreme Court to decide the issues of law presented. The court
framed its inquiry in terms of one question: does a child not conceiv-
ed at the time negligent acts were committed against its mother
have a cause of action against the tortfeasor for its injuries
resulting from that conduct?"
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT HOLDING
The threshold question before the court in Renslow was
whether the plaintiff could complain of the results of conduct that
had preceded her physical existence. Clearly she could not on the
basis of the controlling Illinois law with its requirement of viability
prior to conduct." Plaintiffs injuries must have started at a point
soon after her conception in the summer or fall of 1973. The
discovery in December of that year of the possibility of harm from
6. 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
7. Id
8. I
9. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
10. 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
11. Rodriguez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953).
19781
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her mother's sensitized blood prompted induction of labor in March,
1974, as the earliest point at which the plaintiff was able to sustain
life apart from her mother, ie., was viable. The alleged tortious con-
duct of the defendants had occurred in 1965. The court, however,
reviewed viability as the first moment of legal personality in the
light of recent evidence showing that it varies considerably accord-
ing to the race and weight of the fetus." Noting also that clearly
meritorious claims arising from fetal injury suffered during a
previable stage were arbitrarily cut off, the court rejected the
viability standard as a precondition of a common law tort action,
significantly defined no new standard and allowed the plaintiff to
press her action.
3
Issues surrounding the concept of duty were the court's second
consideration: did the defendants owe the plaintiff any standard of
conduct prior to her conception? A legal duty and the standard of
care that arises in law from it can be imposed only as to actions
whose results were reasonably foreseeable at the time of their com-
mission."4 Illinois cases had defined the concept of foreseeability to
include injuries to those whose existence was not apparent to the
tortfeasor at the time of his conduct, as when an action results in
harm to remote and unknown persons." In the Renslow case,
however, the defendants' conduct occurred in 1965, at a time when
the plaintiff's "existence" was not only not apparent but was wholly
devoid of any indicium of substantive, physical presence. The majori-
ty nonetheless found that it was not unforeseeable in 1965 that the
plaintiffs mother might well become pregnant and that their actions
on her might have deleterious effects on any eventual child. Also,
the issue of foreseeability was presented in the context of an appeal
of a motion to dismiss so that the court was obliged to accept the
validity of all facts well-pleaded. Assuming foreseeability as a
necessary condition of plaintiffs action, the court passed to the issue
of duty as a narrower, sufficient factor in assessing liability.
The concept of duty encompasses a more restricted range of ac-
tions than either causality or foreseeability.6 It is, furthermore, a
general legal concept and represents the judicial reflection of socie-
12. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971), cited in 367 N.E.2d at 1252.
13. 367 N.E.2d at 1252-53.
14. Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 1961 COLUM. L. REv. 1401,
1417-18, cited in Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 375, 308 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1974).
15. Wintersteen v. Nat'l Cooperage and Woodenware Co., 361 Ill. 95, 197
N.E.2d 578 (1935).
16. Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974).
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ty's sense of what one person owes others as members of a com-
munity.17 In finding that the instant defendants owed the plaintiff a
duty, the court relied on its holding in Dini v. Naiditch,8 in which a
defendant's negligent actions gave rise both to the
plaintiff-husband's suit for personal injuries and to the
plaintiff-wife's suit for loss of consortium. The defendant's breach of
duty to the husband was thus transferred to the wife by reason of
the existing relationship linking the two. So also in Renslow, the ma-
jority found that in breaching their duty of professional conduct to
the mother, the defendants became liable as well for the injuries
they caused the daughter.'9 Breach of duty to the one was transfer-
red for the protection of the other so that the plaintiff could enforce
her right to be born free of the effects of the defendants' harmful
actions.
Logic and sound policy were cited by the court in support of its
holding. The court stated that it was illogical to allow recovery to
one not apparently existent when injured and deny recovery to
another potentially injured when not actually existent at all.2" The
lapse of time between conduct and injury was held not to be a
disabling impediment to suit where causality could be found. The ad-
vance in curative medical techniques was also cited as enhancing the
holding's prophylactic usefulness.2' The court countered the argu-
ment that its holding might impose perpetual liability, as to suc-
cessive generations of families whose genetic material had been
damaged through radiation, by noting that the injury in the instant
case was not self-perpetuating but would end in this generation with
the death of the plaintiff. The court also looked forward to princi-
pled judicial treatment of future cases in the same area.' The case
was then remanded for consideration of the factual issues of
foreseeability, causality and damages.
Most strictly analyzed, the facts and holding in Renslow do not
describe a pre-conception tort, a term whose meaning should be
limited to situations in which the genetic material transmitted to
the child from the parents had been damaged, as by the effects of
medical treatment or radiation.23 Here, while the defendants' con-
17. 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
18. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).




23. See the distinctions proposed in Note, Preconception Injuries: Viable Ex-
tension of Prenatal Injury or Inconceivable Tort, 12 VAL. U.L. REV. 143, 144-46 (1977),
19781
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duct antedated the plaintiffs conception by several years, the injury
she suffered occurred at an early stage of her gestation. Had Leah
Ann been removed from her mother's womb prior to that stage (if
this were possible), she would have suffered no ill effects from
defendants' conduct. In addition to eliminating the viability standard
of legal personality, the Illinois Supreme Court has also allowed
recovery for prenatal injuries that follow at some remove from the
conduct that caused them. 4 This analysis, however, leaves untouch-
ed the necessity of the concept of contingent personality, as it will
be developed here, as a legal theory to instrument the right-to-be-
born-sound rationale adopted by the court.
ANALYSIS OF PRIOR CASE LAW
In finding a right in the plaintiff to be born free of prenatal in-
juries caused by defendants' breach of duty, the Renslow court built
on a foundation of personal law laid in America by Mr. Justice
Holmes in his opinion in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton."5
In that case, an action for wrongful death resulting from injuries
negligently inflicted on a fetus was dismissed due to the decedent's
lack of separate existence at the time of the conduct despite live
birth after a gestation of four or five months. Holmes rejected
analagous criminal law (per Lord Coke) which allowed prosecution
for homicide of wilful conduct resulting in live birth of the affected
fetus with death following thereafter.' Noting that the injured un-
born had not yet "reached [any] degree of quasi-independent life,"
Holmes found the decedent had been a part of the mother at the
time of conduct, hence without standing to complain of injuries suf-
fered in utero.
It should be clear, however, that the holding in Dietrich rested
on a factual determination based on the fetus' stage of development.
As such, it did not reach the issue of whether the common identity
of mother and unborn might end at some point prior to live birth.
More importantly, Holmes' logic schematized the events of the
with which this comment may profitably be read. Illinois may be added to the list of
states that have adopted the right-to-be-born-sound theory of recovery, discussed in
the note cited above at 156-57.
24. Another statement of this point is that the court has expanded the class
of persons affected by negligent actions to include those who enter it after the specific
conduct. The concept of contingent personality allows the better view that the class of
affected persons includes all those who have existence as a factual condition or logical
possibilty.
25. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
26. Id. at 15-16.
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prenatal injury case so that, whether injury followed conduct im-
mediately or at a later time, both had to be preceded in time by the
personal existence of both parties. Personality was thus seen as the
prerequisite of rights and duties arising in this area of tort law.
While the decedent in Dietrich became a person in law through live
birth, his right to a standard of conduct ripened only after the con-
duct for which a duty could be found. Medical science in Holmes' day
was largely unable to link conduct with injury following long after;
today, medicine is increasingly able to pinpoint such causal relation-
ships. The threshold legal question however is not the temporal and
spatial relationship of conduct to injury, but whether the conduct
was done to a person, to a right-holder, to whom a duty might be
owed. The requirement of personality prior to conduct and a fortiori
to injury is central to Dietrich, to the other cases that follow, as
well as to Renslow, and it presents conceptual problems that the
majority in Renslow only partially answered.
The question of prenatal personality not posed by Holmes in
Dietrich was first answered in Illinois in Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital.' There, an expectant mother was involved in the fall of an
elevator at the hospital where her nine-month-old fetus was to be
delivered. Labor followed the fall, and the child was born alive with
severe injuries. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld dismissal of the
minor plaintiff's suit on the ground that his "distinct and indepen-
dent existence" had begun only after his injuries." This court's test
was clearly stricter than Holmes' suggested minimum of "some
degree of quasi-independent life."
Dissenting from the majority in Allaire, Mr. Justice Boggs at-
tacked the extension of the Dietrich rationale to the facts of Allaire
precisely on the basis of the unborn's evident separability from its
mother at the time of the defendant's conduct. In arguing against
live birth as the substantive determinant of personality, Boggs
stated:
[W]henever a child in utero is so far advanced in prenatal
age as that, should parturition by natural or artificial
means occur at such age, such child could and would live
separable from the mother and grow into the ordinary ac-
tivities of life, and is afterwards born and becomes a liv-
ing human being, such child has a right of action for any
injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his or her
27. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
28. Id. at 642.
19781
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person at such age of viability, though then in the womb
of the mother.'
Thus, the decision in Allaire closed the door left ajar in Dietrich,
but not until Mr. Justice Boggs had announced and defined the key
concept of viability.
In addition to the conceptual problems of personality and duty
and the factual problems of the causal and cognitive link of conduct
and injury, courts outside Illinois had found the lack of a contract
between an injured unborn and a common-carrier defendant a bar to
recovery, even assuming personality.' This lack of contractual
obligation was overcome in a Canadian case, Montreal Tramways
Co. v. Leveille,1 in which the court held the defendant liable in tort
and, more importantly, found a right of action in a viable fetus,
subsequently born alive. Though based on civil law principles deriv-
ed from Justinian,2 this precedent-making decision of the Canadian
Supreme Court was extensively quoted by Judge McGuire in the
first American case, Bonbrest v. Katz,' to find a common law right
of action for malpractice in a viable fetus. The court distinguished
Dietrich factually and recognized the viable unborn as a person, able
both to suffer harm in utero and after live birth to complain of its
injuries. The decision thus modified the middle term of the classic
legal syllogism by substituting pre-viable for unborn, thereby allow-
ing the viable fetus, born alive, to sue for recovery.
The finding of personality in Bonbrest undermined the substan-
tive basis of Allaire, which soon after was overruled in Illinois by
Amann v. Faidy.Y There the court accepted viability as the per-
29. Id at 650.
30. Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367
(1913).
31. Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille, [1933] S.C. Rep. 456.
32. The Canadian Supreme Court, per Justice Lamont, cited Justinian in
Leveille, as follows: DIGEST 1.5.7: Qui in utero perinde ac si in rebus humanis esset,
custoditur, quoties de commodis ipsius partas quaeritur. (An unborn child is taken care
of just as much as if it were in existence in any case in which the child's own advan-
tage comes in question.); DIGEST 1.5.26: Qui in utero sunt in toto paene jure civili in-
teliguntur in rerum natura esse. (Unborn children are in almost every branch of the
civil law regarded as already existing.) Alan Rodger, in his comment in [1974] Jura. REV.
83, includes another cite, DIGEST 50.16.231, in discussing the use of this Roman princi-
ple in Scots law of prenatal injury but objects that its use in this area is counter to the
Roman rule of liability and hence derives no authority from Roman law as it is receiv-
ed into Scots law. Even without authority, the Roman principle demonstrates an en-
viable simplicity and elegance.
33. Bonbrest v. Katz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
34. Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
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sonalizing moment and allowed suit to be brought under a wrongful
death statute by the administratrix of a viable fetus injured in utero
and dying of its injuries shortly after live birth. The court cited the
viable fetus' distinct identity from its mother, in fact and as
recognized analagously in property and criminal law, together with
the rationale ubi jus, ibi remedium, as the bases for its holding. The
increase in medical knowledge silenced the "argument ad terrorem"
raised as to proof of causality. Rodriguez v. Patti in that same
term, saw the recognition of a common law right of action in the
viable fetus. Because it was brought by a minor plaintiff on a com-
mon law right of action for damages in tort, Rodriguez may be said
to have been the controlling statement of Illinois law in this area
prior to Renslow.
Substitution of viability for live birth as the substantive deter-
minant of personality and of the possibility of duty assured that the
rights of the viable unborn would be protected so long as it was
alive. With death in utero, however, and still birth, the injured
fetus' right of action would be extinguished at its death unless
revived by operation of a wrongful death statute. In Chrisafogeorgis
v. Brandenburg,' the court recognized that live birth was no longer
required for a finding of personality by holding that a viable fetus,
injured in utero and later stillborn, had become a person in utero
and was thus within the saving provisions of the wrongful death
statute, thereby allowing the fetus' administrator to bring an action
for its injuries and death.
The conceptual contours of viability soon proved to be less
sharply defined than those of live birth and hence less suitable as a
clear criterion of personality. Viability is affected by the race and
weight of the fetus together with the length of pregnancy. Medical
advances push the possiblity of separate fetal existence farther back
in pregnancy, and the possibility of test-tube fetal environments is
no longer inconceivable. 7 Responsive to demands 'for substantive
justice, activist courts are reluctant to deny claims on so capricious
35. Rodriguez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953).
36. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenburg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
Amann differs from Chrisafogeorgis in that the Amann decedent, viable when injured,
was born alive and was thus regularly included within the provisions of the wrongful
death statute. The decedent in Chrisafogeorgis was stillborn though viable when in-
jured so that the court could recognize intrauterine personality through viability even
without subsequent live birth and thereby allow recovery under the wrongful death
statute. Personality even through viability had nonetheless preceded injury.
37. See the discussion and notes in Preconception Injuries, supra note 23, at
160-61.
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a basis, especially since medical science is able to frame the prob-
ability of causal links between conduct and injury with ever nar-
rower limits.' Thus, in Daley v. Meier,39 an Illinois appellate court
allowed a suit brought by a one-month-old fetus. Citing the New
Jersey case Keely v. Gregory,"0 for the proposition that the legal en-
tity of the child begins at conception, the court rejected the require-
ment of viability and looked instead to the union of sperm and egg
as the moment at which a separate identity of person may be said to
have come into existence."
In going behind the requirement of conception for legal per-
sonality, announced in Daley, the Renslow court has undermined the
holding of Rapp v. Hiemenz,'2 and made it doubtful that a similar
case will be similarly decided in the future. In Rapp, recovery under
a wrongful death statute was denied where the stillborn plaintiff
had received its injuries prior to viability. If, as Daley holds, a
separate identity of person exists in the fetus as of conception, or,
according to Renslow, even earlier, the rationale of Chrisafogeorgis
in finding personality even in the stillborn would tend to obviate
any impediment to a suit brought by the administrator of such per-
son's estate under a wrongful death statute. A finding of no duty in
such a case would be incongruous.
FINAL TREATMENT OF RENSLOW
With this development in mind, the court's holding in Renslow
appears both more amazing and less satisfactory. Assuming a causal
and cognitive link between defendants' conduct and plaintiffs in-
juries, ie., assuming causality and foreseeability, the court still had
to conceptualize a way in which the person of the plaintiff preceded
the defendants' conduct. This is true without regard to the
majority's attempt to finesse the problem of duty by means of the
device of transferred negligence. Duty cannot create persons;
neither can foreseeability. Tort law is an area of the private law of
persons, as Holmes made clear in Dietrich.3
The court's answer, passed over without comment in the opin-
ion, was to disengage the concept of personality from any substan-
38. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal
Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1962), cited in 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
39. Daley v. Meier, 33 Ii1. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961).
40. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
41. 178 N.E.2d at 694. See also Sana v. Brown, 35 Il1. App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d
187 (1962).
42. Rapp v. Hiemenz, 107 Ill. App. 2d 382, 246 N.E.2d 77 (1969).
43. 138 Mass. at 15-16.
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tive determinants, from live birth, viability, quickness or even con-
ception, as necessary personalizing moments in the plaintiffs ex-
istence. In so doing, the court removed the last vestige of the
Holmesian requirement of a physical indicium of personality." Of
course, only persons who have some indicium of physical existence
can bring causes of action, but, by pushing recognition in law of per-
sonality back beyond even conception, the court has found personal
existence without physical presence. But if it has no physical
presence, what quality of being does this person have; what was
"there" at the time of the defendants' conduct? The plaintiffs ex-
istence in 1965 consisted in the logical possibility of her existence
later, in 1973, when that distinct but indeterminate potentiality
made an appearance in factual reality, in the waking life of con-
sciousness. Conception would seem clearly such an appearance, as
would viability. The concept of personality employed by the court is
thus a wholly formal, wholly logical construction having no
necessary specific substantive underpinning.45 Only in this way could
the person of the plaintiff be said to have existed prior to the defen-
dants' conduct.
The effect of Renslow is to remove time and space deter-
minants from the legal definition of personality and to open the con-
cept up as a logically infinite range of human possibilities, awaiting
a substantive appearance. By removing physical requirements of
personality, except as facts susceptible of direct proof, the court has
brought judicial treatment of the concept to its logical endpoint.
Henceforth, the legal issue of personality in this area of tort law will
be settled affirmatively on the basis of any showing of existence in
fact of an injured plaintiff. In this way, personality has become a
question of fact in Illinois tort law.
The difficulty in using this substantively empty concept arises
when one seeks to pinpoint which conduct resulted in the injury
44. Cf. Ford, The Totalitarian Justice Holmes, 159 CATHOLIC WORLD 114
(1944), for a discussion of Dietrich in the light of Holmes' purported materialist point
of view. While the Renslow court abandoned the attempt to find a physical terminus a
quo of legal personality, it did not abandon Holmes' schematization of the events of the
personal injury action, in which personality of both parties must precede conduct and
injury. Without this scheme, this tort would cease to be personal and would take on
the character of strict liability.
45. The resort to legal formalism on the part of activist courts is an aspect
suggested by Renslow that lies outside the scope of this comment. One may note the
irony involved in the use of a formalistic, logically projected concept of personal ex-
istence in a time marked by attempts to define a person's being in terms of individual-
ly rooted'consciousness. On the return to formalism in the name of substantive justice,
cf. Gilmore, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. (1977).
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that is the basis of the tort action. Such conduct must be causally
linked to the injury, but mere causality sets no limits on how far
back the causal chain can go. But for the past, the present would not
be as it is. A comprehensive survey of any action would result in an
infinite regress into all preceding causes and effects; all of existence
would be engulfed in liability as movement was made along the
"seamless web" of history in which possibilities are actualized and
effects are traced back to causes."6 The court accordingly found
causality a necessary but insufficient indication of the range of ac-
tions which may be said to result in compensable harm.
Finding causality inadequate, the court reaffirmed the legal
principle of duty as a limiting factor of liability. 7 The means used to
find a duty to the plaintiff was to derive it from the duty that the
defendants owed the plaintiffs mother. The court reasoned that the
defendants might reasonably have foreseen the eventual physical ex-
istence of the plaintiff as a possibility latent in the mother in 1965;
they therefore found a duty in the defendants to maintain a profes-
sional standard of care to protect that existence from prenatal in-
jury. Pinpointing the relation of the plaintiff and her mother as the
link between defendants' conduct and the plaintiffs injuries has the
effect of limiting the holding's precedential value and of palliating
perhaps the sense that the defendants were unfairly held liable on a
novel theory of duty to non-existent persons.
In fact, however, the device of transferred negligence is fac-
tually inappropriate and tends to weaken the logic of the court's
holding on the issue of personality. As Mr. Justice Underwood
pointed out in his dissent,'8 a wife's right to sue for loss of consor-
tium due to negligent injury to her husband is bottomed on an ex-
isting relationship among persons. Here no such relationship existed
except that of the factual existence of the mother and the logical ex-
istence of the plaintiff as a possibility of the mother, as envisioned
by the majority. It is only by virtue of this link that the defendants'
breach of duty to the mother can transfer to the daughter. But as a
logical possibility of an existent person, ie., as a part of her mother,
the plaintiff cannot sue. Foreseeable harm to the mother cannot
create a duty to the plaintiff, who can sue in her own right or not at
all, as Dietrich made clear. Defendants' negligence cannot therefore
46. Cf. Unger, Law in Modern Society 114 (1976), for a discussion of the prob-
lems of specificity and generality in historical analysis.
47. 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
48. Id. at 1261-66.
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have transferred in 1965. Perhaps it transferred in 1973, the year of
the injury. In that case, duty would attach only after the conduct, a
replay of Dietrich. On the majority's analysis, the defendants were
held to a duty imposed either before the fact of plaintiffs separate
possession of legal rights or after the fact of conduct. Neither case
is possible or consistent with the formalization of the concept of per-
sonality through which a person, contingent in 1965, was allowed to
sue upon becoming actual in 1973. The majority thus ended by
holding that the plaintiff was a person in 1965, if not in re, then in
spe, for the purposes of bringing suit, but that the defendants' duty
in 1965 or 1973 was owed not to her but to her mother. Use of
transferred negligence obscured the logic of the majority's holding
and was not in fact necessary.
In his concurring opinion, the late Mr. Justice Dooley pointed
the way to a more satisfactory approach, that of finding a con-
tingent breach of duty to the contingent person of the plaintiff in
1965, made actual in 1973 upon her existence and injury in fact.'9 In
this way, the plaintiffs existence, later evidenced by her conception,
may be said logically to have preceded the defendants' conduct,
which in 1965 set in motion the possibility of harm that came to a
factual realization in the plaintiff in 1973, the year of the onset of in-
jury and hence of the accrual of the action. Once personality as a
logical possibility is seen to precede conception, the gap between
conduct and injury can be treated as a question of causality only and
is no longer dispositive of the issue of duty in that there was no
time when the defendants might not have owed a standard of con-
duct to the plaintiff, existent logically or factually. From this, it is
clear that judicial activity must henceforth focus on the principle of
duty as a limit on liability for prenatal injury. Here, for example,
had the defendants exercised the professional community's standard
of care in 1965, the court still could have allowed plaintiffs suit,
found a right in the plaintiff to be born sound, but denied recovery
for failure to show a breach of duty on the part of the defendants.
The posture of the case as an appeal of a motion to dismiss
prevented factual determination of the issue of duty so that the last
action of the court in Renslow was to remand the case for such con-
sideration by a trier of fact.
CONCLUSION
Tie fundamental issue in Renslow appears not to have been
causality, foreseeability or even duty. The key was recognition of
49. I& at 1256-61.
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the contingent personality of the plaintiff in 1965. In so doing, the
court recognized the existence of an infinite range of human
possibilities it was the duty of those then living to protect and
safeguard. Seen in this light, the warning of the magazine writer as
to a drift from traditional principles of duty and respect for human
personality seems clearly misconceived. Responsibility necessarily
precedes accountability. The Illinois Supreme Court in Renslow has
correctly acknowledged that persons are responsible for those who
will come after as well as those now existing. The concept of con-
tingent personality suggested here is no more fictional than the ex-
istence of the logical possibilities which people plan for and against
in everyday experience. It obviates no factual test of causality or
foreseeability and reaffirms the principle of duty as a more limited,
judicial reflection of society's good sense and acceptance of respon-
sibility. If, in the end, the court failed to realize the full potential of
its conceptual reworking of legal personality, it has nevertheless
defined a sphere of interests in law which other courts may wish to
protect as well.
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